Leikkauspolitiikka ei ratkaise Euroopan talouskriisiä
Taloustieteen nobelisti Joseph Stiglitz kirjoittaa kolumnissaan, kuinka julkisen kulutuksen säästöohjelmat eivät auta palauttamaan sijoittajien, kuluttajien ja liike-elämän luottamusta talouteen.
Kansan Uutiset:
Lue myös:
Taloussanomat: Islanti osoittautumassa ihannevelalliseksi
Paul Krugman: Julkinen velka ymmärretään väärin
Jussi Ahokas: Talouden realiteetit ja yhteiskuntapolitiikka
Robin Hahnel: Leikkauspolitiikka ei ole ratkaisu
Harvard Business Review: There is no invisible hand
Robin Hahnel: Perusteet markkinoita vastaan
Project Syndicate 07.05.2012
Joseph Stiglitz: After Austerity
NEW YORK – This year’s annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund made clear that Europe and the international community remain rudderless when it comes to economic policy. Financial leaders, from finance ministers to leaders of private financial institutions, reiterated the current mantra: the crisis countries have to get their houses in order, reduce their deficits, bring down their national debts, undertake structural reforms, and promote growth. Confidence, it was repeatedly said, needs to be restored.
It is a little precious to hear such pontifications from those who, at the helm of central banks, finance ministries, and private banks, steered the global financial system to the brink of ruin – and created the ongoing mess. Worse, seldom is it explained how to square the circle. How can confidence be restored as the crisis economies plunge into recession? How can growth be revived when austerity will almost surely mean a further decrease in aggregate demand, sending output and employment even lower?
This we should know by now: markets on their own are not stable. Not only do they repeatedly generate destabilizing asset bubbles, but, when demand weakens, forces that exacerbate the downturn come into play. Unemployment, and fear that it will spread, drives down wages, incomes, and consumption – and thus total demand. Decreased rates of household formation – young Americans, for example, are increasingly moving back in with their parents – depress housing prices, leading to still more foreclosures. States with balanced-budget frameworks are forced to cut spending as tax revenues fall – an automatic destabilizer that Europe seems mindlessly bent on adopting.
There are alternative strategies. Some countries, like Germany, have room for fiscal maneuver. Using it for investment would enhance long-term growth, with positive spillovers to the rest of Europe. A long-recognized principle is that balanced expansion of taxes and spending stimulates the economy; if the program is well designed (taxes at the top, combined with spending on education), the increase in GDP and employment can be significant.
Europe as a whole is not in bad fiscal shape; its debt-to-GDP ratio compares favorably with that of the United States. If each US state were totally responsible for its own budget, including paying all unemployment benefits, America, too, would be in fiscal crisis. The lesson is obvious: the whole is more than the sum of its parts. If Europe – particularly the European Central Bank – were to borrow, and re-lend the proceeds, the costs of servicing Europe’s debt would fall, creating room for the kinds of expenditure that would promote growth and employment.
There are already institutions within Europe, such as the European Investment Bank, that could help finance needed investments in the cash-starved economies. The EIB should expand its lending. There need to be increased funds available to support small and medium-size enterprises – the main source of job creation in all economies – which is especially important, given that credit contraction by banks hits these enterprises especially hard.
Europe’s single-minded focus on austerity is a result of a misdiagnosis of its problems. Greece overspent, but Spain and Ireland had fiscal surpluses and low debt-to-GDP ratios before the crisis. Giving lectures about fiscal prudence is beside the point. Taking the lectures seriously – even adopting tight budget frameworks – can be counterproductive. Regardless of whether Europe’s problems are temporary or fundamental – the eurozone, for example, is far from an “optimal” currency area, and tax competition in a free-trade and free-migration area can erode a viable state – austerity will make matters worse.
The consequences of Europe’s rush to austerity will be long-lasting and possibly severe. If the euro survives, it will come at the price of high unemployment and enormous suffering, especially in the crisis countries. And the crisis itself almost surely will spread. Firewalls won’t work, if kerosene is simultaneously thrown on the fire, as Europe seems committed to doing: there is no example of a large economy – and Europe is the world’s largest – recovering as a result of austerity.
As a result, society’s most valuable asset, its human capital, is being wasted and even destroyed. Young people who are long deprived of a decent job – and youth unemployment in some countries is approaching or exceeding 50%, and has been unacceptably high since 2008 – become alienated. When they eventually find work, it will be at a much lower wage. Normally, youth is a time when skills get built up; now, it is a time when they atrophy.
So many economies are vulnerable to natural disasters – earthquakes, floods, typhoons, hurricanes, tsunamis – that adding a man-made disaster is all the more tragic. But that is what Europe is doing. Indeed, its leaders’ willful ignorance of the lessons of the past is criminal.
The pain that Europe, especially its poor and young, is suffering is unnecessary. Fortunately, there is an alternative. But delay in grasping it will be very costly, and Europe is running out of time.
"How can confidence be restored as the crisis economies plunge into recession? How can growth be revived when austerity will almost surely mean a further decrease in aggregate demand, sending output and employment even lower?Markkinat ovat luonnostaan epävakaat, ja kokonaiskysynnän laskemisesta aiheutuvasta laskusuhdanteesta syntyy helposti itseään vahvistava kierre. Stiglitzin mukaan julkisen kulutuksen säästöohjelmat vain pahentavat kriisiä, koska ne vähentävät kokonaiskysyntää entisestään, mikä taas ajaa yrityksiä vähentämään tuotantoa ja työllistämään vähemmän. Myös toinen taloustieteen nobelisti Paul Krugman ja IIF:n johtaja Charles Dallara ovat samoilla linjoilla.
This we should know by now: markets on their own are not stable. Not only do they repeatedly generate destabilizing asset bubbles, but, when demand weakens, forces that exacerbate the downturn come into play. Unemployment, and fear that it will spread, drives down wages, incomes, and consumption – and thus total demand."
Kansan Uutiset:
Krugmanin mukaan kahden viime vuoden kokemukset ovat vakuuttavasti osoittaneet, ettei julkisten menojen leikkaaminen rohkaise kuluttajia ja liike-elämää kuluttamaan enemmän. ”Menoleikkaukset laskusuhdanteessa saavat laskukauden vain syvemmäksi”, kirjoittaa Krugman.Taloussanomat:
Krugman toteaa, että oikeaoppiset käyttävät Irlantia esimerkkinä leikkauspolitiikan onnistumisesta, mutta todellisuudessa Irlannin lainakulut ovat edelleen korkeammat kuin Espanjan tai Italian.
Eurooppa ja ennen kaikkea sen päärahoittaja Saksa ovat keskittyneet liian paljon säästötoimiin kasvun kustannuksella, kansainvälisen rahoitusalan yritysten Institute of International Finance -yhdistyksen johtaja Charles Dallara sanoo.Markkinat ovat luonnostaan epävakaat, koska niillä vaikuttavat epävakauttavat voimat - markkinatoimijoiden täysin rationaalinen toiminta - ajavat markkinoita koko ajan kohti kuplia ja taantumia. Laskusuhdanteessa kokonaiskysynnän väheneminen kannustaa yrityksiä vähentämään tuotantoa ja työllistämään vähemmän, koska nyt on odotettavissa, etteivät he saa tuotteitaan myydyksi yhtä hyvin kuin ennen. Ja kun yritykset vähentävät tuotantoa, tämä vähentää kokonaiskysyntää entisestään ja vahvistaa kierrettä. Tämän vuoksi julkisen kulutuksen leikkaaminen laskusuhdanteessa pahentaa tilannetta, koska se edesauttaa kokonaiskysynnän pienenemistä ja täten pahentaa laskusuhdannetta. Julkista kulutusta lisäämällä taas voidaan kasvattaa kokonaiskysyntää ja yrittää kääntää talouden suunta noususuhdanteiseksi.
Lue myös:
Taloussanomat: Islanti osoittautumassa ihannevelalliseksi
Paul Krugman: Julkinen velka ymmärretään väärin
Jussi Ahokas: Talouden realiteetit ja yhteiskuntapolitiikka
Robin Hahnel: Leikkauspolitiikka ei ole ratkaisu
Harvard Business Review: There is no invisible hand
Robin Hahnel: Perusteet markkinoita vastaan
Project Syndicate 07.05.2012
Joseph Stiglitz: After Austerity
NEW YORK – This year’s annual meeting of the International Monetary Fund made clear that Europe and the international community remain rudderless when it comes to economic policy. Financial leaders, from finance ministers to leaders of private financial institutions, reiterated the current mantra: the crisis countries have to get their houses in order, reduce their deficits, bring down their national debts, undertake structural reforms, and promote growth. Confidence, it was repeatedly said, needs to be restored.
It is a little precious to hear such pontifications from those who, at the helm of central banks, finance ministries, and private banks, steered the global financial system to the brink of ruin – and created the ongoing mess. Worse, seldom is it explained how to square the circle. How can confidence be restored as the crisis economies plunge into recession? How can growth be revived when austerity will almost surely mean a further decrease in aggregate demand, sending output and employment even lower?
This we should know by now: markets on their own are not stable. Not only do they repeatedly generate destabilizing asset bubbles, but, when demand weakens, forces that exacerbate the downturn come into play. Unemployment, and fear that it will spread, drives down wages, incomes, and consumption – and thus total demand. Decreased rates of household formation – young Americans, for example, are increasingly moving back in with their parents – depress housing prices, leading to still more foreclosures. States with balanced-budget frameworks are forced to cut spending as tax revenues fall – an automatic destabilizer that Europe seems mindlessly bent on adopting.
There are alternative strategies. Some countries, like Germany, have room for fiscal maneuver. Using it for investment would enhance long-term growth, with positive spillovers to the rest of Europe. A long-recognized principle is that balanced expansion of taxes and spending stimulates the economy; if the program is well designed (taxes at the top, combined with spending on education), the increase in GDP and employment can be significant.
Europe as a whole is not in bad fiscal shape; its debt-to-GDP ratio compares favorably with that of the United States. If each US state were totally responsible for its own budget, including paying all unemployment benefits, America, too, would be in fiscal crisis. The lesson is obvious: the whole is more than the sum of its parts. If Europe – particularly the European Central Bank – were to borrow, and re-lend the proceeds, the costs of servicing Europe’s debt would fall, creating room for the kinds of expenditure that would promote growth and employment.
There are already institutions within Europe, such as the European Investment Bank, that could help finance needed investments in the cash-starved economies. The EIB should expand its lending. There need to be increased funds available to support small and medium-size enterprises – the main source of job creation in all economies – which is especially important, given that credit contraction by banks hits these enterprises especially hard.
Europe’s single-minded focus on austerity is a result of a misdiagnosis of its problems. Greece overspent, but Spain and Ireland had fiscal surpluses and low debt-to-GDP ratios before the crisis. Giving lectures about fiscal prudence is beside the point. Taking the lectures seriously – even adopting tight budget frameworks – can be counterproductive. Regardless of whether Europe’s problems are temporary or fundamental – the eurozone, for example, is far from an “optimal” currency area, and tax competition in a free-trade and free-migration area can erode a viable state – austerity will make matters worse.
The consequences of Europe’s rush to austerity will be long-lasting and possibly severe. If the euro survives, it will come at the price of high unemployment and enormous suffering, especially in the crisis countries. And the crisis itself almost surely will spread. Firewalls won’t work, if kerosene is simultaneously thrown on the fire, as Europe seems committed to doing: there is no example of a large economy – and Europe is the world’s largest – recovering as a result of austerity.
As a result, society’s most valuable asset, its human capital, is being wasted and even destroyed. Young people who are long deprived of a decent job – and youth unemployment in some countries is approaching or exceeding 50%, and has been unacceptably high since 2008 – become alienated. When they eventually find work, it will be at a much lower wage. Normally, youth is a time when skills get built up; now, it is a time when they atrophy.
So many economies are vulnerable to natural disasters – earthquakes, floods, typhoons, hurricanes, tsunamis – that adding a man-made disaster is all the more tragic. But that is what Europe is doing. Indeed, its leaders’ willful ignorance of the lessons of the past is criminal.
The pain that Europe, especially its poor and young, is suffering is unnecessary. Fortunately, there is an alternative. But delay in grasping it will be very costly, and Europe is running out of time.